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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Edyn Duarte-Folgar was ineligible for 
cancellation of removal, denied his request for a continuance, and ordered him removed to 
his home country of Guatemala.  While his appeal was pending before the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, we issued Guadalupe v. Att’y Gen., 951 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2020), 
which bears on his eligibility for cancellation of removal.  Duarte-Folgar requested the 
Board reverse the IJ’s decision to deny him cancellation of removal and remand his case 
to the IJ to consider this intervening case law.  But the Board instead merely affirmed the 
IJ’s decision to deny a continuance.  Because we conclude that decision was inadequate, 
we grant the petition for review and remand for the Board to reconsider its ruling and 
explain its reasoning. 
 
I.  
Duarte-Folgar entered the United States without inspection in 2003 and was placed 
in removal proceedings in 2013, just months shy of the ten years of continuous residency 
required for cancellation-of-removal consideration.  See 8 USC § 1229b(b)(1)(A).  Before 
his departure date, the Supreme Court decided Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), 
which held that a notice to appear omitting the date and time of the hearing is defective and 
thus fails to stop the clock for an immigrant’s continuous-residency period.  Because 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Duarte-Folgar’s initial notice was defective, he sought an additional continuance before 
the IJ to apply for cancellation of removal, arguing that he had now accrued the necessary 
ten years of physical presence.  But the IJ read Pereira differently, concluding the defect 
in Duarte-Folgar’s notice to appear was quickly cured by his hearing notice.  The IJ also 
noted that the only evidence of hardship to a U.S. citizen relative (required for cancellation) 
that Duarte-Folgar had provided was his son’s birth certificate.  The IJ thus denied the 
motion for a continuance, pretermitted (i.e., summarily denied) the application for 
cancellation of removal, and ordered Duarte-Folgar removed to Guatemala. On appeal, the 
Board affirmed, and he now petitions for our review. 
II.  
On the record before us, the Board’s decision does not adequately address the issues 
presented by Duarte-Folgar.  In his brief to it, he argued that, “in light of Guadalupe, the 
IJ’s decision to pretermit [his application for cancellation of removal] was erroneous[,] and 
accordingly this matter should be remanded for consideration of [his application,] 
including an evidentiary hearing.”  A.R. at 13.  But the Board inexplicably construed 
Duarte-Folgar as appealing only “from the portion of the [IJ’s] November 5, 2018, decision 
denying his motion for a continuance to apply for cancellation of removal.”  Id. at 3.1  
Nowhere in its opinion is there a discussion of the IJ’s decision to pretermit Duarte-
 
1 Despite its focus on the continuance, the Government concedes that the Board’s 
decision operates as a final order of removal for purposes of our jurisdiction.  See A.R. at 
19; Gov’t’s Br. at 1–2.  And further, we retain jurisdiction to review for abuse of 
discretion the Board’s denial of a continuance because that discretion is not reserved to 




Folgar’s application nor his request for a remand.  See Tipu v. I.N.S., 20 F.3d 580, 586 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (remanding where “the Board failed to consider one of the factors in Tipu's 
favor”); Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 233 (3d Cir. 2003) (“In order for us to be able 
to give meaningful review to the BIA's decision, we must have some insight into its 
reasoning.”). 
We recognize that evidence of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the 
U.S. citizen son of Duarte-Folgar is required for him ultimately to obtain cancellation of 
removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), and it is within the Board’s discretion to consider, 
along with other factors, whether he has established a prima facie case of cancellation of 
removal when ruling on his request for a continuance.  See Matter of L-N-Y, 27 I. & N. 
Dec. 755, 757-58 (BIA 2020).  But a lack of hardship evidence in the record before us is 
not a sufficient reason to affirm, as the Board explicitly invoked this rationale only to justify 
the denial of a continuance.  See I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) 
(“Generally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of 
a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.”).  And with the IJ’s reasons for 
summarily denying Duarte-Folgar’s application at least partially abrogated by Guadalupe, 
the Board may yet determine that it is appropriate to remand to the IJ or supplement the 
record, especially as this is a case where the need to collect and produce this evidence was 
not apparent until a recent change in the doctrine.  See id. at 18 (noting as further 
justification for an agency remand that it could lead to the presentation of further 
evidence”) 
* * * * * 
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The opinion before us is not sufficient to justify the Board’s decision.  We thus grant 
the petition for review and remand to the Board for it to consider explicitly Duarte-Folgar’s 
argument that the IJ’s decision to pretermit his application for cancellation of removal 
should be reversed and remanded in light of Guadalupe and/or to allow him to submit 
evidence of the hardship to his son if Duarte-Folgar is removed. 
